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jurisdictional basis for granting a divorce to servicemen within the
respective forum."8 The significance of such statutes is unclear, espe-
cially since two states have enacted both the serviceman divorce
statute and the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act.
The New York decision in Rosenstiel and, more significantly, in the
Wood case," has in effect done away with the discrepancy between
recognition of sister-state and foreign divorce decrees. New York
refrained from applying its own domicile rules to the foreign judg-
ment because jurisdiction was established under the foreign rules,
both parties appearing in the litigation. This approach may or may
not be the most salutary and realistic one to take today. But while
divorce laws in the several states remain so widely divergent and while
states like New York retain archaic standards for divorce, the bulk of
problems arising from the migratory divorce are not solved. Indeed,
this leads to the further, more obvious consideration that those who
can afford the luxury of a "quickie" sister-state divorce or (in New
York) a foreign divorce, realize greater legal benefits than those who
are less affluent. Legislative action, rather than judicial leniency, is
therefore necessary to remedy these problems, which can ultimately
be traced to the stringent divorce laws such as those now operative
in New York."
Pauline R. Karlsberg
Federal Taxation - Tax Lien - The Role of a
State Recording Statute
I. THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN
Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for
the imposition of a tax lien on the property and rights to property,
both real and personal, which belong to a taxpayer who neglects or
refuses to pay his taxes after demand has been made upon him.1
"See note 45 supra.
"9 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel; Wood v. Wood, 16 N.Y.2d 717, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).S00As this issue went to press, New York passed a new divorce law. See N.Y. Times,
April 28, 1966, p. 36, col. 3-7. Not only did New York broaden its grounds for divorce,
but it also set out statutory presumptions of New York citizenship when a party obtains a
divorce out of state. The statute, however, fails to declare that a divorce obtained out of
state by a New York domiciliary will not have effect in New York. In view of the judicial
background in New York of recognition of such divorces, the courts may yet determine that
domicile has not been made a jurisdictional requisite for recognition of divorces obtained
out of New York.
' The statute rests upon the congressional power to levy and collect taxes, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, and was held to be constitutional in Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338
(1943).
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The lien arises when a jeopardy assessment is made by the district
director of Internal Revenue and, by operation of law, automatically
attaches to all the property of the delinquent taxpayer. No court
proceeding is necessary. Section 6323 (a) requires that the govern-
ment file notice of the lien before it is valid against mortgagees,
pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors. If these protected
classes acquire their interests in the taxpayer's property before the
notice is filed, the lien is invalid against them. Section 6323 (a) was
enacted because of a number of instances in which property pur-
chased from a delinquent taxpayer by a bona fide purchaser had
been seized and sold by the federal government under what is now
section 6321.' The lien had arisen before they had acquired their
interests, but since the government did not have to file notice, they
had no knowledge of the lien.
II. APPLICATION OF THE LIEN
Two basic issues arise in contests between the United States and
purchasers of property from a delinquent taxpayer. First, does the
delinquent taxpayer have an interest in the property in question?
Second, is the purchaser protected by section 6323 (a)?
Under section 6321, the lien attaches to all property and rights to
property belonging to the delinquent taxpayer. State law determines
the interest of the parties in the property while federal law controls
whether or not the lien attaches to the state-defined interests.' This
treatment is said to strike a proper balance between the legitimate
and traditional interests which the state has in creating and defining
the property interests of its citizens, and the necessity for a uniform
administration of the federal revenue statutes
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (a). The notice must be filed at the office designated
by the state where the property is located, or, if the state has not designated an office, in the
office of the clerk of the federal district court for the judicial district in which the property
is located.
aIn United States v. Curry, 201 Fed. 371 (D. Md. 1912), the court said that the gov-
ernment's lien was unaffected by the fact that a subsequent purchaser became such without
knowledge that the federal government had any claim upon the property. In United States
v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893), property subject to a federal tax lien was conveyed to a
purchaser without knowledge of the lien. The purchaser maintained that, since the lien was
not recorded in compliance with Louisiana law, it was void as against a bona fide purchaser.
The Court held that because of the variations existing in state laws, to subject federal tax
law to the recording laws of the states would be a violation of the constitutional direction
to assess and enforce taxes with uniformity. As originally written, the federal tax lien statute
contained no exceptions or limitations. REv. STAT. § 3186 (1875). Subsequent purchasers
were not protected from the imposition of a tax lien on property in which they had acquired
an interest. Nor was the federal government required to observe the local procedure for the
filing of liens against property.
4 United States v. Aquilino, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51
(1958); United States v. Dallas National Bank, 152 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1945).
'United States v. Bess, note 4 supra.
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In Aquilino v. United States,6 the delinquent taxpayer was a gen-
eral contractor whose payments from a job were subject to a statu-
tory trust for the benefit of the unpaid sub-contractors. The Court
remanded the case to the state court" for a determination of whether
the sub-contractors had an ordinary lien or whether they had ben-
eficial title to the funds, reasoning that if they had equitable title,
the lien could not attach. The New York court of appeals held that
the sub-contractors had equitable title, and that the general con-
tractor had no interest to which the lien could attach s Thus, an im-
portant factor in deciding whether a lien will attach to property is
whether the taxpayer holds equitable title. The Fourth and Ninth
Circuits have also considered this factor essential in deciding whether
the taxpayer has any property to which a tax lien will attach
A purchaser within the protection of section 6323 (a) is one who
acquires title to property for a valuable consideration in the manner
of vendor and vendee.' The Treasury regulations use essentially the
same definition, but add in explanation that the determination of
whether a person is a purchaser shall be made by reference to the
facts and realities in a given situation rather than to the technical
form or terminology used. A person may be entitled to protection
as a purchaser under section 6323 (a) even though he is otherwise
designated under state law."
III. UNITED STATES V. CREAMER INDUSTRIES, INC."
On January 21, 1959, Creamer Industries, Inc., and Maxwell Steel
Company entered into an agreement whereby all of Maxwell's assets
were to be conveyed to Creamer. The contract and the deeds of con-
veyance inadvertently omitted the description of six lots of land. On
6United States v. Aquilino, 363 U.S. 509, 514 (1960).
'The taxpayer had impleaded the United States and the unpaid subcontractors as rival
claimants to the funds in the New York state courts.
Aquilino v. United States, 10 N.Y.2d 271, 176 N.E.2d 826 (1961).
9
In Swartz v. United States, 191 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1951), the taxpayer married a
woman while he had a wife living. He fraudulently led the woman to believe that he was
her husband, and she conveyed property purchased with her own money to taxayer and
herself as tenants by the entireties. Tax liens were filed against the land for taxpayer's de-
ficiency in income taxes. The court held that since the woman had equitable title based on
a theory of resulting or constructive trust, the land was not subject to sale under execution
of an income tax deficiency judgment. In United States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1947), the maker of a promissory note under California law had an equitable right of set
off which was prior in time to the government's lien against the property of the payee of
the note. The government was not allowed to assert its lien until the equitable right was
satisfied. The rights of the Internal Revenue collector seeking to establish a lien for taxes on
a taxpayer's right to property do not extend beyond those of the taxpayer.
1"United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
11 Treas. Reg. § 301.6323-1a.(2) (ii) (1955).
12 349 F.2d 625 ($th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965).
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March 24, 1959, the United States made a jeopardy assessment against
Maxwell for delinquent federal income and excise taxes, and filed
notice thereof two days later. Subsequently, Maxwell executed and
delivered to Creamer a correcting deed which was recorded on April
28, 1959. The United States claimed that its tax lien attached on the
date of filing to the lots omitted from the original contract and deeds.
Creamer brought suit to enjoin the sale of the property. The district
court ruled that Creamer was a purchaser within the meaning of
section 6323 (a) and, therefore, that the government's lien on the
lots was invalid."3 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
held that the lien had attached to the property in question and that
Creamer was not a protected purchaser within the meaning of
section 6323 (a). The court implied that section 6323 (a) was appli-
cable only to the situation in which a purchaser acquires his interest
in the property subsequent to assessment and prior to notice.' The
court found that since there was no occurence which changed Cream-
er's rights between assessment and the filing of notice, Creamer could
not be a purchaser within the protection of section 6323 (a)." This
reasoning is correct since if the purchase took place before assess-
ment, there would be no interest of the taxpayer to which the lien
could attach. Also, the purchaser is protected by his prior interest. If
the purchase took place after the filing of notice, the purchaser has
constructive notice of the lien and purchases at his peril.
The Texas Recording Statute requires that a transfer of real
property be recorded before it is valid against bona fide purchasers
and creditors." The court in the instant case held that the United
States was a "creditor" within the meaning of the statute, 7 using
Henderson v. Odessa Building & Finance Co." to reach its decision.
In Henderson, a judgment creditor asserted its lien against a lot which
the debtor had intended to convey to a purchaser in a deed given
prior to levy, but in which the lot had been incorrectly described.
It was held:
The failure to convey the lot levied upon by [the creditor] . . . through
mutual mistake of the parties gave [the purchaser] . . . an equitable
right to have the deed reformed by correction deed or a decree in
equity, but, as [the creditor] . . . had no knowledge of such equity at
13 63-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 5 9699 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
14 349 F.2d at 628.
1" Ibid.
"eTEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (1840). This statute provides that all sales of
realty are void as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuabic consideration without
notice unless such deeds are recorded. However, as between the parties, and to purchasers and
creditors with notice, the sale is valid and binding.
'7 349 F.2d at 628.
sO2 4 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
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the time the levy was made, the lien thereby affixed was superior to [the
purchaser's] . . . right to such reformation. 9
The Fifth Circuit, in Creamer, ruled that the Henderson decision
was almost "on all fours" with the present case, and rendered judg-
ment for the United States.
This case illustrates a recurring problem in tax lien litigation -
whether or not a purchaser of property from a delinquent taxpayer
must record his interest to protect it from later attachment and
sale by the United States to satisfy delinquent taxes of the prior
owner. The Internal Revenue Code does not require by its terms
such a recording and the Supreme Court has not ruled on this point.
In the absence of such a ruling, the lower courts have followed state
law." The result is that failure to record the transfer has been held
to be immaterial when recording is not required by state law," but
only a recorded interest is protected where recording is necessary in
order to render the interest valid as against third persons acting in
good faith." This distinction is questionable in light of the fact that
the government does not rely on record title in assessing deficiencies
and filing notice thereof. The Eighth Circuit, in Gauvey v. United
States,24 so reasoned in holding that federal tax liens are not affected
by state recording statutes. In Creamer, the court allowed the gov-
ernment to cut off the equity of the purchaser even though Max-
well, the taxpayer, had only bare legal title to the property in ques-
tion. The government was thus permitted to take a greater interest
in the property than was held by the taxpayer. Since the government
does not rely on record title, it should get only what the taxpayer
actually has, and not what a judgment creditor or mortgagee who
does rely on record title might receive. Under the Henderson decision,
Maxwell held only record legal title while Creamer held the equitable
right of reformation or equitable title. Creamer thus allows the gov-
ernment lien to attach to any interest a state bona fide purchaser or
creditor might reach. This ignores the distinction, as pointed out by
Judge Brown in his dissent, between the approaches of the Texas
Recording Act and the federal tax lien statute. The Texas Recording
statute speaks in terms of the persons against whom the conveyance
1Id. at 394.
2" But see the separate opinion of Justice Whitaker, joined by Justices Douglas, Burton,
and Harlan, dissenting, in United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958), in
which the view was expressed that a mortgage was superior to a federal tax lien although it
was not recorded under the state's fraudulent conveyance statute.
2a But see Gauvey v. United States, 291 F.2d 42 (8th Cir. 1961), where the court held
that the state recording statute could not affect a federal tax lien.
"United States v. Anders Contracting Co., 111 F. Supp. 700 (D.S.C. 1953).
"Underwood v. United States, 118 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1941).
'4291 F.2d 42 (8th Cir. 1961).
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is not good, such as bona fide purchasers and judgment creditors.
On the other hand, Judge Brown stated, the federal tax lien statute
speaks in terms of the origin of the lien:
The tax lien arises, the tax lien comes into being, only as to property
or rights to property belonging to the taxpayer. [Maxwell] had no right
to such property. And yet it is this-ownership by the taxpayer-
which gives rise to the lien for the National Government. Congress has
not said that this Nation has a tax lien against any and all property
once owned by a delinquent taxpayer to the same extent as some inno-
cent purchaser . . . might have under local recordation statutes."
Judge Brown's position is supported by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Winnett 6 which held that the rights of the internal revenue
collector seeking to establish a lien for taxes on a taxpayer's right to
property do not extend beyond those of the taxpayer. This seems to
be the more just and equitable rule.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Creamer, while freely quoting the
Aquilino decision, ignored the beneficial interest rule of Aquilino.
Maxwell held only bare legal title to the property in question as did
the contractor in Aquilino, while Creamer held all the beneficial inter-
est as did the sub-contractors in Aquilino.7 Thus, the Fifth Circuits'
decision in Creamer seems to conflict with the rule laid down by the
Aquilino decision."8 To be consistent with Aquilino, it would have
been better for the court to raise a constructive trust as did the dis-
trict court in Swartz v. United States.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Creamer appears to be incorrect. It seem-
ingly ignored the beneficial interest rule. Further, there is a conflict
among the circuits as to the effect of a state recording statute. Since
the government does not rely on recording statutes, it should not be
able to cut off the equity of a purchaser who did not record his
interest and should be limited when enforcing a tax lien only to those
rights that the delinquent taxpayer had. Because of this conflict
among the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Supreme Court
should resolve the question of whether the government can cut off
the equity of an unrecorded purchase at its earliest opportunity, or
as Judge Brown suggests in his dissent, Congress should step into the
"349 F.2d at 629 (Brown, J., dissenting). (Emphasis added.)
26 165 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947).
"7 In fact since the date of the original contract of sale between Creamer and Maxwell,
Creamer had been receiving all rents and benefits from the lessees of the property in question.
2" See notes 4 and 8 supra and accompanying text.
2"191 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1951).
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